Second, expected income is an important driving force for potential entrepreneurs. By decreasing the expected returns to successful entrepreneurship, the wealth tax may negatively impact the probability of seeking to become one.
In this article, a simple model is presented that illustrates how the wealth tax affects the choice between becoming self-employed or working for another. Specifi cally, I begin with the Blanchfl ower and Oswald (1998) model and extend it to incorporate a wealth tax. The model shows how a wealth tax impairs self-employment by limiting funds available and by reducing the incentives to become self-employed. The article provides some insights pertaining to the importance of fi nancial incentives to become self-employed as well as manage the liquidity constraint.
To examine whether wealth tax affects self-employment, actual data are analysed, albeit coarsely. A simple comparison of OECD countries that tax wealth and those countries that do not, suggests that there is a remarkable difference in self-employment between the two sets of countries. For instance, during the time period 1980-2003 countries that did not tax wealth had an average self-employment rate that was 24 per cent higher than in countries that taxed wealth. More careful analysis, however, reveals that much of the gap can be explained by other inter-country differences, and that the actual effect of the wealth tax is much smaller. Specifi cally, by performing simple differences-in-differences estimation using abolition of the wealth tax in four countries as natural experiments, it is found that abolishing wealth tax increases self-employment by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points.
Why the Wealth Tax may Impact Entrepreneurial Activity
There are two main reasons for the wealth tax to infl uence the chances of becoming an entrepreneur. First, wealth tax infl uences occupational choice directly by negatively impacting the amount of funds available and limiting wealth accumulation. This, in turn, limits the amount of funds available for start-ups. Second, wealth tax affects the proportion of individuals with entrepreneurial vision by impacting their expected net profi t. A model that captures both mechanisms is developed as follows.
I start with a simple model based largely on the work of Blanchfl ower and Oswald (1998) wherein individuals choose to become either entrepreneurs or employees. To become an entrepreneur, one requires both entrepreneurial vision possessed by a certain share (β ) of the population, and capital. There exist a number of yet to be developed projects; each of them requiring a different amount of capital (k). In addition to capital, each project needs one entrepreneur's labour. The profi t from project k is π (k), assumed to be strictly increasing. Capital endowment is distributed across the population with density function, f (k), where k lies between zero and one (normalising the wealthiest person's capital assets at unity). Those individuals lacking the required capital can attempt to borrow with probability z of successfully obtaining a loan.
1 In addition it is assumed that there is no unemployment. Anyone can fi nd work in the non-entrepreneurial sector at wage w, which equals the marginal product of labour in the non-entrepreneurial sector. The wage w is assumed to be declining in N, the number of employees. Population is normalised at unity and in equilibrium the number of entrepreneurs is E.
Utility for an entrepreneur is given by
where π (k * ) is profi t from entrepreneurship, i is utility from being independent 2 , and k * is the amount of capital needed for the marginal entrepreneurial project. For employees, the only source of income is from wage labour and utility, u, where u = w.
Individuals with entrepreneurial vision successively form their own businesses until and in equilibrium, either capital or vision constraints are binding in aggregate or the utility from running a business equals the utility from work. In the latter case,
The number of entrepreneurs in the economy, and by choice of units the probability of self-employment for one individual, is
The total number of entrepreneurs in the economy is, thus, equal to the product of the probability of having entrepreneurial vision, the number of individuals with required capital plus the probability of vision, the probability of successfully obtaining a loan and the number of individuals with less than required capital.
It can easily be seen that increases in the proportion of population with vision (β ), the utility of being independent (i) and the probability of obtaining a loan (z) lead to increases in the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs in the economy.
Assume now that the government taxes wealth at tax rate t and that the tax revenues obtained are used to fi nance public goods that neither affects the profi t of entrepreneurs nor occupational choice directly.
3 Wealth tax can affect the number of entrepreneurs in the economy through several channels. First, it has a direct effect on the amount of capital available to fi nance entrepreneurial activity. Even before a wealth tax was introduced, individuals were constrained from businesses by lack of capital. By negatively impacting the amount of wealth available, the wealth tax constrains potential entrepreneurs even further. The marginal project still requires k * but the entrepreneur now needs k * /(1-t) pre-tax, increasing the number of potential entrepreneurs that are capital constrained.
The number of entrepreneurs in the economy is now given by
To identify how the probability of entrepreneurship is affected by the wealth tax, equation (2') is differentiated with respect to t, which gives:
The sign of expression (3') determines how the wealth tax affects the number obtaining a loan. This is always less than 1. Hence, the sign is determined by dβ/dt. Proposition 1. The wealth tax affects the probability of becoming an entrepreneur negatively if and only if dβ/dt < 0.
Second, wealth tax infl uences the proportion of the population with entrepreneurial vision by reducing the returns to successful entrepreneurship. The proportion of individuals with entrepreneurial vision can be expressed as,
where expected profi t increases the proportion of entrepreneurial vision and β is monotonically positive in E(π).
Wealth tax reduces the returns of successful entrepreneurship. Specifi cally, since potential profi t is assumed to increase the individual's wealth, the net profi t is reduced by the wealth tax to (1-t)E(π (k)). This, in turn, suppresses the proportion of the population interested in starting their own business. Wealth tax thus negatively infl uences entrepreneurial vision, β.
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Proposition 2. dβ/dt is negative since the wealth tax negatively affects net expected profi t and therefore, the incentives to become an entrepreneur.
Empirical Analysis

Data
The impact of the wealth tax on entrepreneurship was studied using data for a large sample of OECD countries. This sample constitutes both wealth tax and non-wealth tax countries. Unfortunately, data on entrepreneurial activity are not readily available. The last term in expression (3') is negative since the z value is used. Specifi cally, data from 22 OECD countries on the share of self-employed (excluding farmers) was used.
Simple Estimates
In 2003 eight OECD countries (Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) taxed individual wealth. In 2007, this number has declined to four, namely France, Norway, Spain and Switzerland. Figure 1 plots the average fraction of self-employment (in non-agricultural sectors) between 1980 and 2003 separately, for the above-mentioned eight countries that had a wealth tax regime for the entire period and countries that did not tax wealth for the same period (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, UK and the US).
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As is evident from Figure 1 , the difference in self-employment between the two groups is sizable. The average self-employment rate during this period was 11.9 per cent in the non-wealth tax countries compared to 9.6 per cent in the wealth tax countries, a difference of 2.3 percentage points (19 per cent). Not only does the level of self-employment differ between wealth and non-wealth tax countries, but the change in selfemployment differs as well. For instance, the average yearly growth in self-employment was 0.63 per cent in non-wealth tax countries compared to 0.39 per cent in the wealth tax countries. self-employment declined since the mid-1990s both in non-wealth tax and wealth tax countries, with larger decline in wealth tax countries (2.6 percentage points) than non-wealth tax countries (0.8 percentage points).
Whether these differences are truly due to the wealth tax or caused by other confounding factors is impossible to disentangle from Figure 1 . However, additional information can be discerned by looking at the pattern of self-employment in the four countries that abolished the wealth tax during this period (Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands). All four countries had average self-employment rates well below the average for the non-wealth tax countries (11.9 per cent). Indeed, the average self-employment rate in these four countries was fully 4 percentage points (34 per cent) lower than the non-wealth tax countries. Interestingly, however, the downward trend in self-employment seen generally in Figure 1 is not evident here. Instead, self-employment seems to be increasing. Austria, for example, witnessed an average yearly growth in self-employment of 2.3 per cent after the wealth tax was removed in 1993 in contrast to an average decline of 1.5 and 0.6 per cent, respectively, in wealth and non-wealth tax countries. In Denmark and Germany, the average growth rate in self-employment was 0.1 and 0.8 per cent, respectively, after their wealth taxes were eliminated in 1997 compared to -2.8 and -0.8 per cent for the wealth and non-wealth tax countries. Similarly, self-employment increased an average of 2.2 per cent after the removal of the wealth tax in 2000 in the Netherlands compared to decline of 3.4 per cent and 1.0 per cent in wealth and non-wealth tax countries during the same period, respectively.
Differences-in-differences Estimation
Even the before-after comparisons of countries that abolished wealth taxes during the studied period are at best indicative and may be confounded by secular trends. Therefore, I constructed estimates based on the formal differences-in-differences approach. Since the data are necessarily limited, the results must be interpreted cautiously. Specifi cally, I compared the change in self-employment before and after the removal of wealth tax between countries that abolished the wealth tax (the treatment group) and countries that either taxed wealth the whole period or never taxed wealth (the control group). This strategy ensures that any secular trends that are correlated with the wealth tax and self-employment do not bias the coeffi cient estimate.
A simple estimate was made where the change in the self-employment rates from the year before to one year after the wealth tax was abolished was compared to the same difference for the control countries individually. Specifi cally, for each of countries that abolished the wealth tax, the change after the wealth tax was abolished is compared to the change over the same time period for the control countries. I also estimated the differencesin-differences by comparing the change two years after the wealth tax was removed and the year before, to allow more time for individuals to respond to the change. In addition, I used different control groups to see how sensitive the results were to the choice of control group.
The results are reported in Table 1 . In the fi rst column, both wealth and non-wealth tax countries are included in the control group. Selfemployment increased after the wealth tax was abolished in each country, but the increase is much smaller than Figure 1 suggests, after secular trends were removed by the differences-in-differences estimation. On average, removing the wealth tax increased self-employment by 0.5 and 0.7 percentage points at one year and two years after the wealth tax was removed, although there is variation across the four countries. In the Netherlands, self-employment grew substantially by one percentage point, whereas the increase in Denmark was much smaller. However, the estimates are potentially contaminated, because the control countries included wealth tax countries. While these countries did not abolish the wealth tax, they might have made other substantial changes in the tax rates and allowances making them poor control candidates. To avoid this problem, I also present estimates (see column 2, Table 1 ) for countries that never taxed wealth as the control group. While this did not change the average results appreciably (0.55 and 0.66, respectively), the effect for Denmark declined substantially (indeed negative for two years after removal) and the estimates for Austria increased.
The four countries that abolished the wealth tax may differ systematically from the other countries. For instance, they are high-tax countries and their low self-employment rates may be a result of being high-tax countries (Fölster, 2002) . To mitigate this problem, I also estimated the differences-in-differences using only high-tax countries in the control group (Belgium, Finland, France, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) in column 3 of Table 1. 7 Again, the results were generally unaffected. Finally, using the model, I estimated the effects of wealth tax in neighbouring countries vis-a-vis countries with similar economic conditions as controls (see columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, respectively). Specifi cally, France and Germany were Austria's controls; Finland and Norway were Denmark's controls; Austria and France were Germany's controls; and France and Luxembourg were the Netherlands' controls. Again, the results were robust and the average effect of removing the wealth tax was still approximately a 0.5 percentage point increase in self-employment.
Differences-in-differences Estimation after Controlling for other Covariates
These simple differences-in-differences estimates are problematic in several respects. First, they rest on a key assumption that the average change in outcome would have been the same for the treatment and the control group had the wealth tax not been abolished. That is, other factors, such as economic conditions, affect the treatment and the control group similarly. If that is not the case, additional explanatory variables must be included. Second, if the treatment group is not truly randomly assigned, the differences-in-differences estimates may be biased. This could happen if the removal of the wealth tax was instituted to improve the entrepreneurial climate. While it is hard to deal with the latter problem, performing regression analysis that allows for other control variables can potentially mitigate the former problem.
Performing a standard differences-in-differences estimation with covariates are problematic in this setting not only because the countries abolishing the wealth tax were few but also as the removal of the wealth tax occurred in different years for various countries. One way to deal with this is to rinse out the effect of other potentially important explanatory variables before performing the differences-in-differences estimation. Specifi cally, I rinsed out real GDP per capita, unemployment, transfer as share of GDP, variables that have been found to explain self-employment in other studies (e.g., Fölster, 2002; Parker & Robson, 2003) , and computed the differences-in-differences estimates on the resulting residuals using the same control groups as in Table 1 . Table 2 reports on these results. In general, the estimates presented in Table 2 are considerably smaller than those presented in Table 1 , suggesting that other factors explained part of the difference in selfemployment between those that abolished the wealth tax and the controls. In particular, real GDP per capita, unemployment, transfers, time and country fi xed effects were found to impact self-employment in the treatment -1993, 1995 -1993, 1996 -1996, 1998 -1996, 1999 0 -1996, 1998 -1996, 1999 0 and control countries differently. Self-employment increased on average (0.2 percentage points) when the wealth tax was abolished using wealth and non-wealth tax countries as controls. When different control groups were used, the increase is similar; although smaller when non-wealth and high-tax countries are used as controls. For the individual countries the differences-in-differences estimates for Austria and the Netherlands were especially lower compared to those in Table 1 , suggesting that the increase found for Austria and the Netherlands in Table 1 are largely driven by other factors. Two other countries, France and Italy, abolished and reintroduced wealth taxes during the study period and can provide additional information about the effect a wealth tax has on self-employment. As the changes were temporary, the information that can be drawn from the experience in these countries is limited. Taxpayers in France were given a temporary relief from the wealth tax between 1986 and 1988. Italy, on the other hand, introduced a wealth tax in 1993 and abolished the same tax in 1998. Table 3 reports on differences-in-differences estimates on the changes in -1985, 1987 -1985, 1988 -1988, 1990 -1988, 1991 -1992, 1994 -1992, 1995 -1997, 1999 -1997, 2000 the wealth tax in France and Italy using the same control groups as in previous tables when controlling for real GDP, unemployment, transfers, time-and country-specifi c effects. The control country in the last row in the upper and lower part of Table 3 is Italy for France and Spain for Italy. The effect on self-employment from the wealth tax removal in France was positive, albeit small. Reintroducing the tax a few years later had a negative (also small) effect on self-employment. For Italy, the effect of introducing the wealth tax actually had a positive, but small effect on self-employment, in all rows but the last (see Table 3 ). Abolishing the wealth tax a few years later had a positive and large effect, when compared to Spain.
Germany
A potential problem with these estimates is that the elimination of wealth tax was in many cases, part of larger reforms that included other tax changes that could affect self-employment. The wealth tax reform in the Netherlands, for instance, was part of a general tax reform that removed the wealth tax but replaced it with a 30 per cent tax on theoretical revenue from capital (assumed to equal 4 per cent of net assets) while exempting actual capital income from taxation. In Austria, wealth tax removal was also part of a larger tax reform that increased general tax credits for all taxpayers and to compensate for the revenue loss, increased the corporate tax rate. To remove the effect of other simultaneous tax changes that took place, I controlled for various tax rates (the tax gap between labour and capital income taxation, the marginal tax rate on labour and capital and the corporate tax rate) in addition to already included covariates before performing the differences-in-differences estimation. When the tax gap and corporate tax rates were controlled, the effect of the wealth tax removal in the Netherlands reduced dramatically to around 0.10 percentage points. For the three other countries the changes are much smaller. Controlling for the corporate tax rate increased the estimate for Austria from roughly zero to about 0.25 percentage points. For the other countries the estimates were generally lower but less sensitive to the inclusion of the corporate tax rate. Moreover, the estimates for Italy presented in Table 3 were sensitive to the inclusion of the corporate tax rate as well as capital gains taxes. In contrast to Table 3 , the introduction of a wealth tax in Italy had a negative effect on self-employment when corporate tax rates were controlled for and a near zero effect when capital gains taxes were included.
Conclusion
Promoting entrepreneurship is widely recognised as an important policy objective. In general, income taxation has been found to have a positive impact on self-employment while the progressivity of the income tax as well as capital gains taxation have been found to affect self-employment negatively. One form of taxation that has so far not been considered, but likely to affect self-employment, is the wealth tax.
This article develops a simple model illustrating how the wealth tax can impede self-employment by reducing the amount of capital available and by reducing the pay-off to successful entrepreneurship.
Data from twenty-two OECD countries indicates that countries that do not tax wealth have systematically higher self-employment than countries that do tax individual wealth. Average self-employment, indeed, was 2.3 percentage points (24 per cent) higher in countries without a wealth tax than in countries that taxed wealth over the time period 1980 to 2003. Differences-in-differences estimation using the elimination of wealth taxes as a natural experiment, however, indicates that the boost in selfemployment due to the removal of the tax is likely to be much smaller, some 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points, suggesting that the systematically higher self-employment in countries without taxes on wealth is likely to be an artefact of other factors correlated mutually with the wealth tax-perhaps overall business-friendliness, attitudes toward risks, or social norms.
Nevertheless, it must be cautioned that these estimates suffer from a number of serious limitations. For instance, the data available are limited and the abolishment of the wealth tax took place in different years in the various OECD countries making it diffi cult to construct control groups. The main strength of the results, however, lies in the consistency across a wide number of different specifi cations.
This article should be seen as a fi rst attempt to study the effect of wealth tax on entrepreneurship and a trigger for future research, preferably using micro-level data to address the issues discussed here as well as to disentangle how the wealth tax affects self-employment by limiting available capital, reducing the net return, or by impacting risk-taking and effort.
